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ABSTRACT
Half of the ten metropolitan areas in the U.S. with the highest traffic fatality rates are in Florida. Crashes and
fatalities are reduced through engineering, education and enforcement. Florida’s road infrastructure (engineering)
requires a significant investment due to decades of population growth. This study analyzes the economic incentives
given to police officers in Florida cities to use traffic citations (enforcement), in the absence of incentives for
engineering or education to prevent crashes and injuries. Florida’s high traffic fatality cities and counties are
analyzed to assess the impact of citations on traffic crashes and automobile insurance premiums. In Florida, police
pensions in participating cities receive a premium tax on automobile insurance policies written within city limits. A
1999 amendment to Florida law requires that increased premium tax collections must fund “extra” police pension
benefits. Consequently, city police officers financially benefit when automobile insurance premiums increase from
increased crash and/or citation rates. The automobile insurance premium taxes disbursed to Florida city police
pension funds increased from $42.1 million in 1999 to $61.5 million in 2003. A chi-square goodness of fit test
indicates that the growth rate of the premium tax revenues increased significantly following the 1999 amendment (p
< 0.001). Florida city residents paid 46 percent more ($2.3 billion) for automobile insurance in 2003 than 1999.
Analysis of Florida’s high traffic fatality cities (Fort Lauderdale Jacksonville, Miami, Orlando, Tampa, and St.
Petersburg) indicates that automobile insurance premiums per 1000 population substantially increased in each city
after the “extra” benefits legislation was passed. Crash rates remained high from 1999 to 2003 and increased in
three of the six cities. The relationship between traffic citations and crashes was analyzed for Florida’s high traffic
fatality metropolitan counties (Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas counties). From
1997 to 2003, traffic citations increased in five of these six high fatality counties. However, statistical analysis did
not identify a relationship with crashes, such that changes in the number of citations written did not have a
statistical relationship to changes in traffic crashes, i.e., traffic citations did not reduce crash rates. Thus, citations
increase insurance rates in the absence of reducing crash rates. The amended Florida law creates a conflict of
interest since police officers financially benefit from increased citations and crashes, and insurance companies
benefit as well. The public choice theory of economics is used to explain why special interests can take precedence
over public interests. Economic incentives should be realigned to eliminate perverse conflicts of interest and
reward reductions in traffic crash, injury and fatality rates through effective prevention methods, which include
roadway infrastructure improvements.
Florida Public Health Review, 2005; 2: 82-91
Introduction
In 2003, 3,169 people died in Florida traffic
crashes. Florida had 18.6 traffic fatalities per
100,000 population and 1.71 fatalities per 100 million
vehicle miles traveled. National averages were much
lower at, respectively, 14.7 and 1.48 (National
Highway Safety and Traffic Administration, 2003).
Florida has five of the 10 metropolitan areas
with the highest urban traffic fatality rates in the
nation. In 2000 and 2001, the Orlando area (Orange
County) led the nation with 17.2 traffic fatalities per
100,000 population. The Tampa-St. Petersburg area
(Hillsborough and Pinellas counties) ranked second,
Palm Beach County third, Jacksonville area (Duval
County) eighth, and Fort Lauderdale area (Broward
County) ninth (The Road Information Program, 2001;
Lush, 2002). Orange, Hillsborough, Palm Beach, and
Broward counties had the highest number of alcoholrelated traffic fatalities in Florida (National Highway
Safety and Traffic Administration, 2003)
In 2003, Florida had four of the top ten cities
with highest traffic fatality rates - Orlando,
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Jacksonville, Miami, and Tampa (National Highway
Safety and Traffic Administration Research and
Development, 2003). Further, Florida has five of the
top ten cities with the highest pedestrian fatality rates.
Miami and Tampa ranked first and second.
Clearwater, Ft. Lauderdale, and Orlando ranked
seventh, eighth and ninth respectively (Shankar,
2004).
Florida had a disproportionate percent of
pedestrian and intersection traffic fatalities in 2003.
Florida pedestrian fatalities accounted for 16% of all
traffic fatalities, whereas the national average was
11%. Approximately 33% of Florida traffic fatalities
occurred at intersections, compared to the national
average of 21%. Only 17% of Florida fatal crashes
resulted from speeding in comparison to 31%
nationally, and 41% were alcohol-related, whereas
the national rate was 46%. More than 18% of Florida
fatalities were attributed to lack of motorcycle helmet
use (83 fatalities) and lack of safety belt use - 494
fatalities (National Highway Safety and Traffic
Administration, 2003). Florida did not require
82
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helmet use or have a primary safety belt law. The
latter became effective for persons under 18 on July
1, 2005.
Florida’s 268 traffic fatalities among elderly
drivers were the highest among all states in 2001.
Florida had a 70% increase in the number of older
drivers killed in traffic crashes from 1991 to 2001
whereas the national average increased by 27% (The
Road Information Program, 2003).
Traffic crashes and fatalities are reduced
using a comprehensive approach through 3Es –
engineering, education and enforcement.
Law
enforcement officers can engage in prevention,
education and enforcement. Research concludes that
drivers operate more conservatively for some period
of time after observing a marked police car, so
deployment of highly visible marked police cars can
promote more conservative driving. Officers can
make traffic stops when drivers violate a traffic law,
and can then choose to write or not write a citation.
Some law enforcement agencies use written warning
systems to track drivers who violate laws but are not
given citations. This system allows for educating
drivers in the absence of fines and insurance
increases, but also permits identifying repeat
offenders. Officers can also write citations when
traffic law violations occur.
Some law enforcement personnel believe
that increasing citations will reduce crash rates. For
example, in 2000, Tampa’s police chief and aide
wrote the following statement: “The best remedy for
aggressive driving and crash prevention is traffic law
enforcement. This is not only the local philosophy,
but one which is nationwide” (Bennett & Holder,
2000). Certain types of citations, such as driving
under the influence and safety belt violations, have
obvious potential to reduce crashes and/or injuries.
A second motivation for citations also
exists. Nationally, some municipalities use traffic
citations to increase revenues, which they perceive as
favorable to increasing taxes.
As such, law
enforcement officers are reported to hide or disguise
themselves to increase opportunities to write citations
and target traffic violators (Story, 2004). Thus,
citations can serve a public safety and/or revenue
generation purpose.
Traffic Citation Economics and “Extra” Police
Pension Benefits
Florida’s penalty for most non-criminal
moving violations, such as running a stop sign, is
$117.50. Fines are higher for speeding and school or
construction zone violations. A city would collect
$23.11 of the $117.50 penalty. Collections are higher
for the larger fines (Compton, 2004).
Insurance companies typically request a
three year driving history when renewing automobile
insurance. However they can request a seven year
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history (Consumer Advocate System, 2005).
Consequently, in addition to fines, a traffic citation
can result in an automobile insurance surcharge
(increase) for three to seven years.
In recent years, automobile insurers have
developed sophisticated “pricing tools” to determine
premium prices. The new tools resulted in higher
premium prices for drivers and higher profits for
insurance companies (Oster, 2004).
Insurance
companies determine premiums by estimating the
funds needed to pay for claims, administration, and
profit.
An automobile insurance premium is
determined by a driver’s age, sex, and marital status,
as well as the model of cars, accidents, claims, traffic
citations, and territory. Territories that have higher
or lower loss records (claims) will have higher or
lower premiums accordingly. Thus, when the local
crash rate is high, automobile insurance rates for all
residents are higher regardless of driving history. In
addition, policyholders are assigned an underwriting
category based on the driver’s history of accidents
and citations, resulting in discounts of 15% and
mark-ups of 35% to 75% (The Kiplinger Washington
Editors, Inc, 2003)
Florida law authorizes participating cities to
receive a 0.85% premium tax on the gross amount of
all casualty insurance premiums collected within a
municipality (Florida Statutes, 2003). The police
pension fund receives the automobile insurance tax
whereas the firefighter’s pension fund receives the
tax on property insurance. The police premium tax
was established in 1953 to encourage the
development of police retirement funds in Florida
cities (Florida Department of Management Services,
2003). The premium tax that accrues to a city’s
police pension fund represents 0.85% of total
automobile insurance policy premiums, such that
each tax dollar collected represents $117.65 paid for
insurance by policy holders in the city limits
(calculated as $1.00 / 0.0085 = $117.65).
A 1999 amendment to Florida law requires
that any amount exceeding the premium tax collected
for the 1997 year must be used to fund “extra
benefits.” Extra benefits must be greater than those
given to general employees and in addition to
benefits provided prior to the effective date. A city’s
police pension fund will collect more premium tax
revenues from increases in population, claims, and
citations.
Reducing Traffic Crashes and Injuries
Roadway
(engineering)
infrastructure
improvements are an important method to reduce
traffic crash and fatality rates since they reduce the
probability of driver error. In the 1950s, strategies to
reduce traffic crashes in the U.S. emphasized
reducing driver errors through traffic law
enforcement and driver education. This emphasis
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was replaced by a more pragmatic prevention
approach that recognized all drivers can make
mistakes. Subsequently, traffic fatalities decreased
by 75% from reducing the probability of driver error
and injury through improved roadways, safer cars,
and emergency medical services. Emphasis was
placed on what caused the crash or injury rather than
who caused the crash (Hemenway, 2002). The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
recognized motor vehicle safety as one of the ten
great public health achievements of the 20th century
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999).
Table 1 provides statistics on fatality rate
reductions from specific road improvements (The
Road Information Program, 2004). In addition,
certain improvements are recommended to reduce
hazards for older drivers.
Table 1. Reduction in Traffic Fatality Rates from
Road Improvements
Reduction in
Fatality Rate in
Percent
Road Improvement
Constructing median for
traffic separation
73
Realign roadway
66
Sight distance
improvements
56
New traffic signals
53
Turning lanes and traffic
channelization
47
Widen or improve shoulder
22
Some driving decisions become more difficult for
older drivers due to deteriorating eyesight, reaction
time, and cognitive abilities. This situation indicates
a need for adding pavement markings and overhead
indicators for turning lanes, using larger lettering on
signage, improving lighting, widening lanes, and
installing longer merge lanes (The Road Information
Program, 2003).
Staff at the Advocates for Highway and
Auto Safety commented on dangerous roads, as
follows. “They have severe curves so that they have
poor sight distance. They have narrow lanes, and all
you have to do is just to depart that lane a couple of
feet and you're into an extremely hostile territory.
There is no margin for error on those roads." NBC
News identified Florida’s highway US-19 as topping
the list of most dangerous roads, as noted below.
Billy wasn't drunk, wasn't doing anything
reckless, wasn't doing anything careless. He was
just walking along the edge of the road. That was
enough.
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Take one family's grief and multiply it by 100.
That's how many pedestrians have been hit and
killed on Florida's US-19 in five years. It's a sixlane meat grinder running 30 miles up Florida's
Gulf Coast. We first visited in 2002, and found
the shoulders of the road dotted with white
crosses memorializing the dead. With fatalities
in triple figures, US-19 is at the top of our list of
dangerous roads (Dateline NBC, 2005).
US-19 does not have a sidewalk. It is estimated that
Florida roads require a $9.5 billion to $23 billion
investment due to decades of population growth in
the absence of adequate infrastructure improvements
(Bousquet, 2005).
Objectives and Methods
This analysis evaluates the economic
incentives given to city police departments in Florida
to use traffic citations and analyzes the effectiveness
of traffic citations in reducing Florida’s high traffic
crash and fatality rates, as well as the related impact
on automobile insurance rates.
The following
research questions are addressed.
• Did premium taxes on automobile insurance
increase at a greater rate once city police
officers financially benefit from increased
automobile insurance rates?
• What relationship exists between crash/citation
rates and premium tax revenues in Florida’s
high traffic fatality cities?
• Did traffic citations increase in Florida’s high
fatality metropolitan areas?
• Does a statistical relationship exist between
changes in the number of traffic citations and
changes in the number of crashes?
The final question addresses whether an association
exists between citations and crashes, i.e., are
increases in citations associated with a declining
number of crashes?
The following sections provide an analysis
of Florida’s high traffic fatality cities to compare
growth rates in premium tax levels before and after a
1999 amendment to Florida law that required the
funding of “extra” police pension benefits from a tax
on automobile insurance. Statistical testing is used to
compare pre-amendment and post-amendment
changes in premium tax collections and to assess
whether changes in traffic citations affected crash and
fatality rates in Florida’s high traffic fatality urban
counties. Statistics on the premium tax and crash and
fatality rates are available from the Florida
Departments of Retirement Services and Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles.
Two years of
motorcycle law enforcement crash reports from the
Tampa area (Hillsborough County) are used to
analyze the percent of crash investigations that do not
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result in a citation, comparing law enforcement
agencies that receive and do not receive extra pension
benefits from the tax on insurance.
Premium Tax Trends
Table 2 provides annual statistics (in
millions) for (a) the premium tax revenues collected
for all participating Florida cities from 1997 to 2003
(Florida Department of Retirement Services, 2004),
(b) the automobile insurance paid by all city residents
estimated by using the $117.65 multiplier, and (c) the
amount of “extra” pension benefits that must be
provided to city police officers. “Extra” benefits
were calculated by subtracting the 1997 premium tax
total of $41.0 million from the premium tax collected
for each year. The “extra” benefits amendment was
passed and became effective in 1999 so extra benefits
were nonexistent in the 1997 and 1998 years.
Automobile insurance policy holders in
Florida cities paid 46% more for insurance in 2003
than 1999. The insurance increase from $4.95 billion
in 1999 to $7.240 billion in 2003 indicates residents
in Florida cities paid $2.3 billion more for automobile
insurance in 2003 than 1999. A chi-square goodness
of fit test indicates that the growth rate of the
premium tax revenues increased significantly
following the 1999 amendment (p < 0.001). Figure 1
shows the annual percent growth rate in the premium
tax collections from 1997 to 2003.
Analysis of Florida’s High Traffic Fatality Cities
In 2003, Orlando, Jacksonville, Miami, and
Tampa were listed with top ten traffic fatality rates
among 150 U.S. cities. Ft. Lauderdale and St.
Petersburg also had high fatality rates. Table 3
summarizes 2003 statistics for these high traffic
fatality cities, including the Fatality Rate per 100,000
Population (National Highway Safety and Traffic
Administration Research and Development, 2003),
Crash Rate per 1000 Population, Citations per 1000
Population, and Adjusted Insurance Rate per Person.
Crash rates include only major crashes that involved
an injury, fatality or wrecker to remove the vehicles,
and exclude minor crashes (Florida Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 2004a). The
Citation Rate is calculated using non-criminal
moving violations that were written by the city police
department (Florida Department of Highway Safety
and Motor Vehicles, 2004b). These citations increase
insurance rates. Criminal citations that result in
arrests, non-moving violations that do not increase
insurance rates, and citations written by other
agencies are excluded. The Adjusted Insurance per
Person statistic was calculated by multiplying the
automobile insurance premium tax collections for
each city by the $117.65 multiplier, and then dividing
by the city population total, and then dividing by the
Florida Public Health Review, 2005; 2:82-91
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Florida price level index (Florida Statistical Abstract,
2004) to adjust for differences in cost of living.
Population statistics were used since the number of
licensed drivers by city was unavailable. The six
citys’ traffic fatality rates of 13.73 to 15.55 per
100,000 population are significantly higher than other
U.S. cities, many of which achieve rates of 4 to 8
fatalities per 100,000 population.
Insurance rates are primarily influenced by:
(a) the crash rate, which is a proxy for property and
injury claims, and (b) the citation rate, which creates
multi-year insurance increases. Orlando’s insurance
rate does not follow this pattern. However, their
tourism rate is three to four times higher than the
other five cities so rental car insurance would
increase their total premium tax collections.
Jacksonville is a consolidated municipality so a
citation rate could not be calculated that is
comparable to the other cities.
The two cities with the lowest crash rates,
Jacksonville and St. Petersburg, had the lowest
insurance rates. Citation surcharges are assessed as a
percent of the premium so lower crash rates result in
a lower surcharge from a citation. St. Petersburg also
had the lowest traffic citation rate.
Figure 2 provides trends in crashes per 1000
population from 1999 to 2003 years for Florida’s
high traffic fatality cities. Since 1999, crash rates per
1000 population increased in Miami, St. Petersburg
and Tampa.
Crash rates per 1000 population
decreased in Ft. Lauderdale and Orlando. However
the rates are now similar to ones in Miami.
Jacksonville’s crash rate increased somewhat through
2002, and then decreased in 2003.
Although Tampa had the highest crash rate
from 2000 to 2003, insurance rates in Miami and Ft.
Lauderdale were higher, possibly due to their higher
traffic citation rates.
Whereas Miami and Ft.
Lauderdale had similar crash rates, Miami’s higher
insurance rate might reflect the significantly higher
citation rate.
Table 4 summarizes the average percent
annual changes in premium tax revenues from 1996 to
1999, the pre-amendment period, with the average
annual change from 2000 to 2003, the time period
following the amendment (Florida Department of
Management Services, 2003). The Annual Rate
Increase per 1000 Population provides the annual
insurance premium increase (adjusted by city
population) for the four years prior to the “extra
benefits” legislation and the four years subsequent to
the legislation. Annual automobile insurance premium
increases were relatively modest from 1996 to 1999,
and annually averaged 2.5 to 23 times greater in 20002003. The large premium increases from 2000 to 2003
reflect insurance company assumptions about each
city’s increased risk for claims.
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Table 2. Premium Taxes, Insurance and "Extra" Benefits for Florida Cities,
1997 to 2003 (in millions)
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Premium Tax Collected
$41.0
$41.2
$42.1
$43.6
$48.7
$54.6
$61.5

Insurance Paid
$4,827
$4,849
$4,953
$5,129
$5,724
$6,419
$7,240

"Extra" Benefits
$0
$0
$1.1
$2.6
$7.6
$13.5
$20.5

Figure 1. Percent Growth Rate in Premium Tax Collections
from Previous Year

12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
1997 1998 1999 2000 200120022003

Table 3. Fatality, Crash, Citation and Insurance Rates by City, 2003
Fatality
Crash
Citation
Adjusted
Rate
Rate
Rate
Insurance
City
Per 100,000
Per 1000
Per 1000
Per Person
Orlando
15.55
26.4
128.8
$1,821
Jacksonville
15.25
16.1
$647
Miami
15.13
25.8
343.5
$1,851
Tampa
15.11
30.0
152.2
$1,154
Fort Lauderdale
14.73
25.1
177.8
$1,345
St. Petersburg
13.73
16.4
96.3
$704
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Figure 2. City Crashes per 1000 Population
35
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Table 4. Premium Tax Revenues by City
Premium Tax
Annual Rate Increase
(in thousands)
Per 1000 Population
2003
1996-1999
2000-2003
1996
Ft. Lauderdale
$1,493 $1,984
2.0%
5.3%
Jacksonville
$2,380 $4,135
0.6%
13.7%
Miami
$4,623 $6,320
1.5%
5.6%
Orlando
$2,022 $3,007
3.0%
9.4%
St. Petersburg
$1,057 $1,490
3.4%
13.3%
Tampa
$2,048 $3,090
1.7%
10.3%

Table 5. Traffic Citations by county

County
Ft. Lauderdale area
Jacksonville area
Orlando area
West Palm Beach area
St. Petersburg area
Tampa area

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

19972003
%
Change

457,824
212,163
219,003
260,167
128,224
154,030

478,162
198,867
225,579
253,878
138,084
173,663

494,168
240,444
255,552
280,250
143,049
183,002

498,006
270,655
244,782
311,323
147,889
191,017

467,052
289,055
248,484
320,358
180,482
196,534

517,543
317,113
214,070
376,252
184,122
213,483

587,378
307,947
185,967
371,944
180,695
229,982

28.3%
45.1%
-15.1%
43.0%
40.9%
49.3%
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Florida’s High Traffic Fatality Metropolitan
Counties
Florida’s five areas that are in the top ten
high traffic fatality metropolitan areas include six
counties since the Tampa-St. Petersburg metropolitan
area includes two counties. Table 5 provides total
traffic citation trends for the six counties (Florida
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
Florida, 2004b). Five of the six areas increased
traffic citations since 1997. The exception was the
Orlando area. Statewide, Florida traffic citations
increased by 27.6% from 1997 to 2003 when 4.3
million were written.
To test the assumption that increasing
citations would decrease crashes, a regression
analysis was performed to assess the relationship
between traffic citations and crashes per 100,000
population from 1997 to 2003 for Florida’s six high
fatality counties. The percent change in the number
of citations written in all counties from the preceding
year is the independent variable. The dependent
variable is the corresponding percent change in
crashes from all six counties. The regression test
results indicate a positive correlation of 0.279 and a
point estimate of 0.159 (p=0.099). This point
suggests the increase in citations did not decrease
crashes. Indeed, the correlation suggests increased
citations as associated with increased crashes.
This calculation is supported by the county
trends. The Orlando area crash rate decreased
beginning in 2000, when citations began to decrease.
Similarly, Jacksonville’s crash rate increased from
1997 to 2002 when citations increased, and the crash
rate decreased in 2003 when traffic citations
decreased. Thus, both Jacksonville and Orlando
decreased crash rates in time periods of decreasing
citations, which suggests alternative strategies were
used. In contrast, the St. Petersburg area increased
citations, which was associated with an increased
crash rate. The Tampa area (Hillsborough County)
consistently had the highest traffic crash and fatality
rates, and had the highest percent increase in
citations. The Tampa area crash rate decreased with
increasing citations from 1997 to 1999. However,
the crash rate increased in 2000 and was sustained as
citations continued to increase through 2003.
Alternatively, Palm Beach and Ft. Lauderdale areas
decreased crash rates in time periods of increasing
citations.
Thus, merely increasing numbers of
citations does not assure reduced crash rates.
Unlike city police departments, sheriff’s
deputies and Florida Highway Patrol troopers do not
receive benefits from automobile insurance premium
tax revenues. In 2003, the city police departments in
five of the six counties wrote more traffic citations
than sheriff’s deputies or the Florida Highway Patrol.
Jacksonville was the exception; however it is a
Florida Public Health Review, 2005; 2:82-91
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consolidated municipality so a distinction between
the city and county could not be made.
To test whether city police departments,
which receive “extra” benefits from premium tax
revenues, are more likely to write traffic citations
than those agencies that do not receive premium
taxes and extra benefits, an analysis was conducted
regarding the number of citations written by each
Tampa area (Hillsborough County) law enforcement
agency in a two year study of helmet use in
motorcycle crashes from July 1999 through June
2001. Florida law permits officers to write a citation
in a crash investigation if the officer conducts a
personal investigation and has reasonable and
probable grounds to believe a traffic offense was
committed (Florida Statutes §316.645 2004). A crash
is only reported on the driving record of drivers who
receive a citation following a crash. A citation
related to a crash investigation can trigger two
separate insurance surcharges, one for the crash and a
second for the citation.
The three Hillsborough County police
departments (Plant City, Tampa, and Temple
Terrace) did not write citations in 23% of crash
investigations. In contrast, sheriff’s deputies and the
Florida Highway Patrol did not write citations in 57%
of crash investigations. The subtotals for the number
of crash reports with citation(s), crash reports with
citation(s) pending, and crash reports without
citations of the two groups were used to compute a
chi-square statistic.
The statistic of 86.92 is
statistically significant (p < 0.001). Thus, law
enforcement agencies that do not receive premium
taxes wrote citations in a significantly lesser percent
of crash investigations than agencies that receive
premium tax revenues.
Discussion
The findings do not demonstrate a consistent
relationship between traffic citations and crash rates.
This indicates the presence of an alternative
explanation for the dramatic rise in citations in most
high fatality areas. The “extra” pension benefit and
associated incentives for Florida city police
departments emphasize traffic citations and is offered
as an alternative explanation. Police departments
directly control the number of traffic citations and
can systematically increase the number written. For
example, Tampa police added a second traffic squad
in 1999 that is dedicated to writing citations, and then
doubled the number of citations written by district
patrol officers the following year. In 2004, they
again announced citations were further increased by
more than 60% in the first months relative to the
previous year. (Tampa Police Traffic Unit, 2004;
Wexler & Carlton, 2000; Morelli, 2004).
88
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Why would elected officials and public
administrators create incentives for traffic citations
and auto insurance increases, while failing to address
more effective ways to prevent crashes and injuries,
such as needed roadway infrastructure?
Two
theories are generally used to explain the decisions of
elected officials. Public interest theory suggests that
legislators enact policies that are designed to promote
the greater good of society. Alternatively, special
interest theory suggests that elected officials and
public administrators act to promote legislation that
benefits specific groups, as opposed to the general
public. The success of special interest groups to
affect policy depends on the structure of the group,
the cost of organization, the resources available to
that group, and the disposition of potential opposing
groups. In this case, the latter consists of drivers,
which consist of disparate groups without the
prospect of organization, therefore ruling out the
possibility of effective monitoring of policies that
affect them indirectly. Elected officials and public
administrators appear to be captured by special
interests due to their influence.
Increasing traffic citations and/or failing to
reduce crash rates ultimately require individuals to
spend more on automobile insurance. The 1999
amendment benefits automobile insurance companies
by creating a financial incentive for police officers to
write more traffic citations, which increases revenues
in the absence of additional insurance company
expense. The public choice theory of special interest
suggests that the benefits that accrue to specific
groups (automobile insurance companies and police
departments and unions) take precedent over the
general public’s interests.
Insurance industry interests were further
advanced in 2005 Florida legislation that increased
driving record points from three to four points for red
light running citations. The fine for a red light
running citation was increased to provide funding for
trauma centers, in addition to the additional point on
the driving record that can create a higher insurance
increase. The legislative analysis identified the
impact to the private sector as “four points assessed
on the driving record, which could result in ….higher
insurance
premiums”
(Florida
House
of
Representative Staff Analysis, 2005). The legislative
analysis did not forecast reductions in crashes or
injuries. Red light running is an odd focus for two
reasons. First, five contributing causes account for
90% of Florida’s traffic fatalities in 2003. The five
did not include traffic signal violations (red light
running). Second, red light running is best controlled
by increasing the length of yellow light timings. A
spokesperson for the National Motorists Association
reported that many red-light violations are caused by
engineering problems, such as overly short yellowFlorida Public Health Review, 2005; 2:82-91
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light times. However, it was noted that some local
governments do not change settings since they do not
want to lose the citation revenue. San Diego had to
cancel 5,000 red light running citations from red-light
cameras (cameras that photograph drivers and their
license plates and send the citation by mail) that were
improperly installed, with shortened yellow lights
(Editorial, St. Petersburg Times, 2001). The District
of Columbia collected $85 million in the first year
following installation of its red-light cameras (Story,
2004).
Consistent with special interest theory,
which asserts that groups that are costly to organize
and inform, Florida voters do not appear to attribute
their high crash and fatality rates or rising automobile
insurance rates to decisions made by elected and/or
law enforcement officials. Likewise, voters do not
appear to hold elected officials accountable for
failures to improve roads and reduce congestion and
high traffic crash and fatality rates. Instead, voters
often appear to believe that more traffic citations are
an effective remedy, thereby assisting to advance
special interests. In fact, policymakers may be
misinformed about the means to reduce traffic
crashes and injuries, due to the influence of special
interest groups.
Conclusions
The quantitative and qualitative analyses of
the high fatality rate communities conclude that a
relationship does not exist between traffic citations
and crashes. However, economic incentives to
Florida municipalities create overemphasis on traffic
citations. This emphasis is inconsistent with public
health research, recommendations from the
transportation sector, and quality improvement
Municipalities should systematically
principles.
analyze the root cause of crashes and resolve high
crash and high traffic fatality locations through
indicated infrastructure improvements and alternative
law enforcement techniques, such as using police
cars as pace cars to prevent speeding and remaining
highly visible to promote safe driving.
The current economic incentives are
perverse since high crash, claim and citation rates
increase
“extra”
police
pension
benefits.
Policymakers should eliminate this incentive and
support initiatives that reward municipalities for
adopting effective traffic safety strategies to prevent
crashes and injuries. The public choice theory
concludes that elected officials will respond to voter
concerns in order to maintain elected positions. The
challenge for public health advocates and the general
public is to organize efforts that advance effective
practices to direct resources toward reducing
Florida’s high traffic crash and fatality rates.
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Further research is indicated to analyze root
causes of Florida crashes and identify opportunities
to reduce crashes and injuries. The need for further
research is implied to determine whether law
enforcement practices to disguise or use unmarked
vehicles, which do not impact driver behavior similar
to marked vehicles, is effective in reducing crash
rates. Finally, research is indicated on whether the
one point increase in red light running violations
results in police departments increasing the number
of red light running citations.
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